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Abstract: The purpose of this contribution is related to our own view of the Austrian 
market approach. We first point out how Menger, Wieser, Hayek (to a more limited 
extent) and Lachmann successively made various analytical achievements which 
contributed to the emergence of an Austrian view of markets as institutions. We then 
characterize the original features of this notion and show why and how it allows a 
better understanding of the specificities of empirical markets and their dynamics. 
Key words : markets, coordination, creation and evolution 
Résumé: Cet article est fondé sur une analyse spécifique de l’approche autrichienne 
du marché. Dans un premier temps nous montrons comment Menger, Wieser, Hayek 
(dans un moindre mesure) et Lachmann ont successivement contribué à l’émergence 
d’une conception des marchés comme des institutions. Nous mettons ensuite en 
évidence les caractéristiques de cette notion et montrons pourquoi et comment elle 
permet une meilleure compréhension de la spécificité des différents marchés et de 
leurs dynamiques. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The Austrian tradition is often associated with a common view of the market as 
a discovery process which forms a major component of a more general social order. 
It is widely thought that this view emerged in Menger’s Principles and found its finest 
elaboration and formulation in Hayek’s later writings and von Mises’s contributions. 
Our viewpoint  contradicts this usual presentation. We believe that there are two 
distinct approaches to the market notion within the Austrian tradition. 
On the one hand, it is possible to develop a view of the market as the unique efficient 
means of coordinating individuals’ plans and actions: this notion can be found in both 
Mises and Hayek. The market appears to be unspecified insofar as its organization 
and workings are assumed to be universal and, therefore, are not really dependent 
on the type of economic goods exchanged or the types of agents who carry out the 
transactions. 
On the other hand, a second market  view, originally stemming from Menger and 
Wieser and continued by Lachmann, can also be developed. Contrary to the first, this 
second view emphasizes the heterogeneity of markets.  Lachmann, for instance, 
clearly emphasizes the importance of the distinction between ‘fixprice’ and ‘flexprice 
markets’. In accordance with this view, markets are,  above  all, institutions.  This 
implies that  there is no universal means of economic coordination. Every type of 
market must be characterized according to its type of organization, kind of good 
exchanged, weight of intermediaries and so forth. Therefore, markets are not 
‘eternal’; they emerge, evolve and disappear; they are evolutionary entities. More 
interestingly, they also interact, an important point we want to emphasize. 
 
The purpose of this contribution is related to our own  view of the Austrian  market 
approach. 
 We will first point out how Menger, Wieser, Hayek (to a more limited extent) and 
Lachmann successively made various analytical achievements which contributed to 
the emergence of an Austrian view of markets as institutions (sections 2, 3, 4 and 5).   3 
We will then characterize the original features of this notion and show why and how it 
allows a better understanding of the specificities of empirical markets and their 
dynamics. Using these foundations, we dedicate sections 6 and 7 to investigating the 
market creation and evolution processes. Section 8 recalls the role of institutions and 
routines within this framework. Finally, sections 9 and 10 draw some main theoretical 




2.  The Market as an Organic Institution 
 
Menger (1871, 1883) considers that markets belong to the category of organic 
institutions, as does  language or the State. When  Menger develops  his exchange 
and  price formation  theories  in  Principles (1971, chapter 4 and 5),  he  mainly 
considers the bargaining scenario, successively  distinguishing isolated exchange, 
monopoly and bilateral competition. In fact, Menger shows no real development when 
he discusses the notion of market as such. However chapters 4 and 5 of the 
Principles are perfectly in line with Menger’s  view  of economics: knowledge and 
power are sufficient to explain exchange. Exchange takes place firstly because both 
sellers and buyers  hope  that trade  will improve  their economic situation. Buyers 
expect that they will meet their needs by ordering desired goods, while sellers look 
for the information about causal relations between higher order goods and individual 
needs and try to foresee future needs. Their remuneration therefore depends on the 
abilities of uncertainty-bearers. Exchange, however, also takes place because both 
sellers and buyers believe that they have sufficient knowledge. Buyers try to be clear 
about their ‘requirements’ (‘Bedarf’ in German) and the quantities of goods at their 
disposal for the purpose  of meeting these requirements, while sellers (i.e. 
manufacturers as well as intermediaries) must have a professional knowledge of the 
available stocks, the costs and prices of the goods they supply. 
Even though Menger does not present a complete market organization theory 
(Arena, 2002), his writings include useful indications from this standpoint which are 
linked: (i) to his view of economic goods and (ii) to his value theory   .   4 
  Menger’s  specific  view  of economic goods is certainly one of the main 
contributions he made to economics. He was the first who stressed the vertical and 
horizontal interdependence of goods and noticed that it logically excludes to consider 
first order goods as the result of the combination of quantities of two ‘homogeneous’ 
factors (e.g. labor and capital). In the different steps of the manufacturing process, 
manufacturers must first learn how to combine the goods needed and then how to 
order these goods to produce lower order goods. If, at some point, they are unable or 
decide not  to order the goods they require, they have  the implicit possibility  of 
acquiring them through exchange.  
Menger’s theory of value is subjectivist and the result of marginal analysis: 
according to his views, the value of a good stems from the expected satisfaction that 
consumers hope to receive from the last consumed quantity of this good. This means 
that the value of a good depends on individual need and the fact that individuals are 
aware that the value of higher order goods is indirectly determined by the value of the 
first order goods to whose production they contribute. 
These indications - given by Menger - are especially useful if we try to explain 
the emergence of markets as organic institutions. In fact, if individuals need to order 
goods they do not  possess or if they realize that these goods have a  higher 
subjective value for them than the supply price of the goods they order, they have an 
incentive to exchange. Exchange c an produce value because of the increase in 
individual and collective wellbeing. Individuals then try to exchange the goods they 
possess for the goods they need.  In  the beginning, individuals search in their 
neighbourhood for individuals they expect to exchange with. Progressively, as they 
learn that they can find the people they are looking for in this neighbourhood, they 
get in touch with their  neighbours in order to  finalize the exchanges they need to 
make. Market is therefore characterized as the locus in which exchange takes place 
and allows the implementation of agents’ individual learning abilities. I t is therefore 
the  result of the interaction of individual actions and cannot be explained by the 
intervention of any form of authority or collective will. One can thus regard market as 
an endogenous ‘focal point’ generated by interacting individual cognitive behaviors. 
The more people enter a given market, the more it is worthwhile for other people to 
enter it, because of network effects, for instance.  This mechanism generates a 
positive feedback process which anticipates the strategic complementarities analyzed 
in modern times by Milgrom and Roberts (1990).   5 
The theory of exchange, related to Menger’s view of economic goods and the 
theory of value based on his subjectivism,  appears to form  the two pillars of his 
market emergence  approach. However, the  ‘double coincidence of  demand’ 
requirement implies the need to assume that there are as many markets as there are 
exchanges. This is why Menger’s notion of exchange and value is completed by a 
theory of money. The emergence of money means  that  another self-organization 
process starts working on markets, generating a single large market where all goods 
can be exchanged for all other  goods. This  money emergence  self-organizing 
process  (due to positive feedback mechanisms) also supports  the manufacturing 
structure since it favors the exchange of consumer goods as well as different level 
capital goods. 
This reconstruction of the Mengerian view of market origin is not complete, however. 
Two other important points also need to be taken into account: (i) the nature of the 
role played by the manufacturing structure; (ii) the fact that economic exchanges are 
constantly changing, new goods are continually produced and new transactions are 
continuously  made. The first point refers to the fact that  the market makes 
manufacturers aware that complementary goods exist as a consequence  of the 
horizontal as well as vertical interdependency of goods. The second aspect is linked 
to  the fact that  individuals are constantly  confronted  by  new interdependencies 
between new goods in relation to the different steps of the manufacturing process. 
 
3.           The Market as a Social Institution 
 
For Wieser (1927), one of the main institutions of a social economy is the market or, 
to be more precise,  markets, since this author refers to “institutions of exchange” 
(Wieser, 1927, p.150). 
Wieser’s view of exchange differs significantly from Walras’ and extends Menger’s. 
Wieser does not consider that pure bilateral exchange offers a universal foundation 
for any economic system. Quite the contrary, he stresses that the mutual wills of 
individual economic agents do not provide the only determinant factors of exchange 
and that institutions also play a fundamental role.  This is why  the market itself is 
considered a ‘social institution’ (Wieser, 1927, p.172). The existence of markets is 
implied by the coexistence of private property and (both horizontal and vertical)   6 
division of  labor.  Production is  implemented by “legally independent” 
individual producers, helped by workers (p.150). 
“In a fully developed money economy, in which individual self-sufficiency disappears, 
all households must finally turn to the market for a satisfaction of their needs” 
(Wieser, 1927, p.150).  In other  words, markets are fundamentally monetary. They 
form  what Wieser called “the great circulation o f the national economy” ( p.151). 
Again, Wieser’s view of the market is entirely different from Walras’. While Walras 
starts from a basic market  economy scheme  based on barter between two 
commodities and then progressively  generalizes it to pure exchange, production, 
capitalization, and in the end, money and credit, Wieser considers that there is no 
market without money.  In Hicks’ words, his theory  is a ‘money theory of markets’, 
since, for Wieser, markets are logically unconceivable if money is not presupposed 
as an institution. 
Walras’ and Wieser’s views of the market not only differ according to the role they 
attribute to money within the exchange process. On the one hand, Walras stresses 
the universal character of pure exchange economies as a general logical device on 
which it is necessary to build the whole edifice of general economic equilibrium. On 
the other hand, Wieser does not emphasize the homogeneity of concrete markets, 
but rather their heterogeneity in accordance with the notion of markets as institutions. 
In seeing markets as institutions, Wieser notices that it is necessary to distinguish 
various “institutions of exchange”. Markets must therefore be differentiated according 
to their specific institutional set-up or, to quote Wieser, their proper “organizations of 
markets”. Market organization is indeed central in Wieser’s approach, as it was in 
Menger’s. Price formation does not follow the same rules if the market is organized or 
“disorganized” (Wieser, 1927, p.195). Markets might be characterized by a common 
feature, but also by their diversity. 
The common feature of markets is the predominant role played by suppliers within 
exchange processes. On the one hand, the freedom of exchange is counterbalanced, 
at least partially, by the ‘forces of compulsion’. Wieser observes that often in the 
process of exchange, agents  do not have “full economic strength “(p.168) and 
therefore, as in “labor” or “usurious loan” contracts, asymmetry exists between the 
parties. Producers may therefore profit from compulsion and can also impose their 
supply prices as a prerequisite imposed on consumers. Markets, however, are not 
identical.  Each is different:  “Theoretically, we have to distinguish in the universal   7 
economic market a s many varieties of partial markets as there are varieties of 
market-indices” (Wieser, 1927, p.175). As we saw earlier, this stress on the diversity 
of markets was not introduced by Wieser, but by Menger within the Austrian tradition 
(see also Arena, 1999). This variety first refers to what Wieser calls “the stratification 
of prices” (Wieser, 1927, p.186). In other words, markets are not all accessible by just 
any type of agent. Thus, the quantities of “mass-commodities” brought to markets 
depend on the consumption needs of all social strata expected to consume these 
goods. Therefore, in mass-commodities markets, prices are determined by the 
poorest agents and only by their marginal utilities. On luxury goods markets, on the 
other hand, “prices are offered according to a standard induced by the purchasing 
ability of members of the higher and highest income strata who are bent on excluding 
the competition of all other rivals” (p.187). Finally, in intermediate goods markets, 
prices are determined according to t he purchasing power of the middle class. 
Therefore, markets are  socially stratified according to the diversity of consumer 
purchasing powers. 
Markets are also differentiated according to their organization. Here the Mengerian 
influence is direct. Factors include: degree of speculation (p.173), type of competition 
(pp.173-174), distance from final consumer (p.176), bid mechanisms (pp.174-176) or 
organization quality (p.195). These causes  allow a set of main markets to be 
distinguished. The labor market is the first described by Wieser, who notices that 
labor is not a product (p.176). Market products are differentiated according to their 
modes of exchange: natural barter (p.174) or monetary exchange (p.175). Money 
markets include loan and stock markets; they do not allow for product exchanges, but 
satisfy investment needs (p.176). Finally, price variations on the “agricultural or urban 
real estate market” often follow the price variations of the money market (p.176). 




   4.     The Market as an Evolutionary Result 
   8 
The idea that market as an institution is a “natural” human evolutionary result 
is developed by Hayek. From a Hayekian perspective, the market is considered to 
generate the stable solution of an evolutionary process. Market also characterizes 
the economic functioning of an  ‘open society’. In  a  tribal society,  individuals  use 
concrete rules of action and can express a collective will: institutions are consciously 
constructed by human beings. Exchange is not anonymous in the least and takes 
place through bargaining. Progressively, with human beings tending to use abstract 
rules, the open society emerges and individuals cannot continue to exchange as they 
used to within an archaic society. First, individuals cannot transmit the totality of their 
knowledge to each other because abstract rules are unconscious and they acquire a 
specific and tacit form of knowledge through their experiences. Second, they can no 
longer make face-to-face transactions since there are a great many individuals in the 
open society.    Individuals are often replaced by economic entities as private 
organizations or regulatory bodies, but these are operated only according to the rules 
prevailing in the open society.  In this context, individuals’ plans and actions are 
coordinated through an evolutionary market process which is assumed to generate a 
stable solution.  Market is therefore able to  favor a “mutual adjustment” of the 
individual plans and actions through a self-organizing process based on a negative 
feedback mechanism. As in Menger’s theory, knowledge plays an essential role in 
allowing individual interactions. Hayek’s “mutual adjustment”  presents its own 
specificities, however. The price mechanism is the main tool which permits such an 
adjustment to occur because it coordinates the individuals’ diverse knowledge and 
the information those individuals gather from their environment. In accordance with 
Menger’s view, market adjustments remain cognitive discovery processes. However, 
these adjustments do not differ in relation to market variety, as in the Mengerian and 
Wieserian theories (see also Arena, 2002). Quite the opposite, Hayek assumes that 
markets are different, but he shares the Walrasian approach in that they all have the 
same coordination process. According to Hayek, the flexible price mechanism tends 
to be valid everywhere in a market economy. Specific ‘market institutions’ (as defined 
by Langlois and Robertson, 2002) do not matter. Hayek’s motivation is simple. 
Individuals do not know and do not need to know one another. This anonymity is in 
fact what warrants the autonomy of individuals in the market order. In spite of its 
richness and originality, at the end of the day, Hayek’s view of market economy 
shares Walras’ idea that  institutional and organizational  market diversity can be   9 
disregarded in favour of the prevailing and universal flexible price mechanism based 
on the assumed anonymity of individual agents. 
 
 
5.  Lachmann’s View of Markets 
 
Lachmann’s view does not oppose Hayek’s as such, but helps discard from 
the Hayekian theory what it has in common with the Walrasian theory of General 
Economic Equilibrium (GEE), e.g., the universal scheme of a competitive price 
mechanism. This is precisely why Lachmann’s critique is directed against Walras’ 
and Pareto’s theory of markets, in particular against their  GEE analysis.  In 
Lachmann’s view, far from providing a universal market representation, the Walrasian 
view deals with a very special case,  derived from  its  deterministic  notion  of 
economics. This view is based on the assumption of a ‘centre of gravitation’, the GEE 
position, which appears to be the basin of attraction for all economic motions. This 
assumption presupposes that there are forces at work pulling the economy towards 
the GEE position. The implementation of such forces first requires that all individuals 
possess the same economic rationality; second that all are price takers; and that, 
finally, in a world of perfect competition, a specific automaton,  “the auctioneer”, is 
able to signal to every individual agent all differences – however small – between 
supply and demand on any  given  market, so that individuals can  instantaneously 
compensate for those differences. The methodology of GEE theory can be extended 
to non–Walrasian cases: On a monopoly market the price is set by the manufacturer 
(under certain adequate constraints) and in a monopsony case, the price is set by the 
buyer (under certain adequate constraints also). Although bargaining can take place 
on an oligopolistic  market, the resulting price is not  “path dependent”  since the 
bargaining process is timeless and therefore virtual. From Lachmann’s standpoint, 
this theoretical framework is fiction rather than an abstraction and, therefore, it can 
hardly  explain the actual  means by  which prices are set. We could a dd to 
Lachmann’s argument that, even if the Hayekian market operation theory is based on 
an ‘empirical’ discovery process  that differs entirely from  a virtual  ‘tâtonnement’ 
mechanism, it is based on the idea that, the competitive  price mechanism is 
necessary in the long run and sufficient to allow the economic system to converge to   10 
a position where,  according to the Walrasian GEE theory, all markets are finally 
cleared. 
According to Lachmann, price formation needs to be based on a much more 
concrete process than the one presented by Walras. For instance,  “from what we 
have just said, it follows that if we wish to understand the significance of fixprice 
markets in general, and the mode of coexistence between fixprice and flexprice 
markets characteristics of our world in particular, such understanding will have to be 
sought within the framework of an ‘Austrian type’ theory of price formation, but on a 
level of abstraction sufficiently low to permit us to designate price setters and their 
ranges of action in various markets” (Lachmann, 1986, p. 131)
3. In order to clarify his 
standpoint, he uses the example of the merchant and the salesman. According to 
Lachmann, a merchant is a firm and a salesman is a part of a firm. Therefore the two 
types of agents act on different markets (the first corresponds to a flexprice market 
and the second to a fixprice market). It follows that both agents do not play the same 
role in the adjustment process (the first  adjusts prices  while the second adjusts 
quantities). This example can be extended to various other cases and suggests that 
institutional variety is a condition of greater market efficiency. 
Lachmann’s views therefore reinforce Menger’s and Wieser’s  ideas  and tend to 
promote market representation in which the institutional context has value. It is now 
time to leave the history of economic thought behind to consider the processes of 






6.  The Creation of Markets 
 
 
                                                                 
3 The idea that it is necessary to consider markets from a “sufficiently low level of abstraction” also 
helps explain the differences between Lachmann’s and Hayek’s view of market processes.   11 
If we try to draw some consequences from Menger’s, Wieser’s and 
Lachmann’s common market  vision, we must first consider the market emergence 
process.  In our opinion,  a  specific  market is created when  buyers and  sellers 
(including entrepreneurs, speculators and followers) negotiate in order to decide 1) 
what goods are to be produced and 2) what prices will be paid for these goods. Two 
consequences arise.  First, during this phase of creation the buyer influences the 
manufacturing process by being able to choose some (but not all) of the product 
characteristics.  And second, in general, both  the  buyer and  the  seller are price 
makers. This  starting-point  is perfectly in line with Menger’s idea that  exchange 
always  involves  bargaining. It is also  in accordance  with  the Austrian idea that 
economic reality is subject to continuous change. New goods and technologies are 
always being  produced by new entrepreneurs and therefore  new markets are 
continuously being created. In this context, it is crucial to investigate the respective 
roles of the various agents.  From an Austrian perspective,  at least  four types of 
agents must be made distinct.  
The first type corresponds to entrepreneurs according to Schumpeter. Entrepreneurs, 
who are risk takers, are key characters in the new market creation process. They are 
simultaneously confronted by and create uncertainty by making risky decisions when 
introducing new goods. Various forms of uncertainty have to be taken into account 
when the  market creation  process is considered.  Strategic uncertainty, which 
economists often view as the only uncertainty,  is actually in the middle of a n 
uncertainty spectrum presented by Langlois and Robertson (1995: 136). On either 
side are what they label (p. 18)  structural  uncertainty (which must be disregarded by 
decision makers because it pertains to future outcomes which cannot be envisaged 
in bounded terms along particular dimensions, or where the relevant dimensions 
along which outcomes may arise cannot even be discerned in advance) and 
parametric  uncertainty (about precisely where, within a range on a particular 
dimension, an outcome might emerge, which may be possible to mitigate through 
strategic choices). Radical product innovations may involve structural uncertainty and 
a leap in the dark on the basis of Keynesian ‘animal spirits’, with little assistance from 
either rules of thumb or market institutions in terms of delimiting the bounds of 
possibility. Kirzner’s analysis, focused on entrepreneurial alertness, could be said to 
have introduced a further dimension of uncertainty: that implied by existing, but   12 
unknown economic opportunities. Too often, however, many Austrian economists, 
such as Schumpeter or to-day, Kirzner or Witt, for instance, overestimate the role 
played by entrepreneurs as if they act in isolation when they decide to innovate and 
introduce new goods frequently supported by new technologies. 
The problem that arises here is related to the agents Kirzner calls entrepreneurs. It is 
clear that, for Lachmann for instance, these entrepreneurs should rather be seen as 
‘speculators’, i.e., as intermediaries according to Menger: “ For us, by contrast, the 
outcome of market processes impelled by interaction between innovations and 
speculators is a subject we dare not ignore as our field of study is not surrounded by 
ditches designed to keep out all disequilibrating forces. Even if it could be shown that 
all speculation is ultimately an equilibrating force, the possibility that speculator 
successes and failures might affect some of the ‘data’ on the path towards 
equilibrium could not be ignored. We have t o ask what happens if each innovator 
finds himself surrounded by a swarm of speculators trying to anticipate the outcome 
of his action. Will it tend to make this task easier or more difficult, make his days of 
success longer or shorter?” (Lachmann, 1986: 126). The existence of this second 
type of agent is virtually present in Schumpeter’s theory of innovation. Besides the 
entrepreneurs he interpreted as economic leaders in accordance with the Austrian 
tradition initiated by Wieser (see Arena and Gloria, 2001; Arena, 2002 and 2003; 
Arena and Festré, 2002 and 2006), one has to distinguish between active imitator-
users or speculators from passive imitator-users or followers. Speculators are risk-
takers. They try to imitate the entrepreneurs who initiate the innovations they find to 
be the most promising or use them in their production processes and therefore utilize 
their alertness in the Kiznerian sense. Followers are risk-adverse. T hey are very 
similar to the producers of the Schumpeterian circular flow; they only introduce new 
technologies or goods when they are sure that their risk is minimized. This does not 
mean that entrepreneurial innovations are always accepted by speculators and 
followers. The role of the former is precisely to make a selection among the 
continuous flow of new goods and technologies, while the function of the latter is to 
reject some innovations, even when they  have been adopted by entrepreneurs and 
speculators. Followers are therefore similar to Wieserian “masses” (Arena, 2003). 
They have no innovative role, but they can exert a negative one. Entrepreneurs and 
speculators must therefore convince them to diffuse new technologies or goods in the 
long run, i.e., and not too quickly in order to gain quasi-rents. Now, depending on the   13 
relative importance of a market’s innovative character, i.e., the relative strength and 
importance of the three types of suppliers on this market (entrepreneurs, speculators 
and followers), the prevailing type of uncertainty can differ. Structural uncertainty is 
predominant when the role of entrepreneurs is strong. Strategic or Kirznerian 
uncertainties correspond to speculator predominance. Finally, parametric uncertainty 
better suits a less innovative market.  
The last type of agent to play a main role in the market creation process includes 
buyers or consumers. This type was often neglected by the Austrian tradition, in spite 
of its stress on consumer sovereignty. To a large extent, buyers also take some risk 
when they decide to buy an entirely new good or technology. They must learn if the 
new good or technology will satisfy their direct needs and if it will be integrated long 
enough into an adequate  manufacturing process.  On  the other side, sellers and 
especially entrepreneurs must convince their potential customers (Langlois, 1992). 
They also have to convince their employees that it is worthwhile and logical to make 
some risky decisions (Witt, 1999). Nonetheless, their potential buyers also need to 
make a risky decision. Without interactions between  these two groups of agents 
(including the three supplier sub-groups), the innovation could fail utterly. 
 
 
The case of the audio CD is a good example of this kind of interaction. The 
audio CD was introduced on the market in 1983 by Philips and Sony, although 
Philips had been working on the Laservision method since 1978. One could assume 
that Philips was unable to convince consumers to change from the vinyl system to 
the CD system in 1978. However,  this explanation does not take the progressive 
move from vinyl to CD into account. In fact, if the innovation is only attributed to the 
entrepreneur’s motivation, one disregards the time it takes to switch from an old 
system to a new, innovative one. A more complete explanation is that some 
intermediaries took the risk of marketing and some consumers took the risk of buying 
new audio material without being sure whether it was able to meet buyer needs
4. 
  
Another example is the Wankel rotary engine. “Wankels have several major 
advantages over traditional designs. Most notable is that they are considerably 
simpler and contain far fewer moving parts; for instance, they have no valves, valve 
                                                                 
4 A demand for change may also be at the origin of this consumer’s motivation.   14 
trains, etc. In addition, the rotor spins the driveshaft directly, so there is no need for 
connecting rods, a conventional crankshaft, balance  assemblies, etc. All of this 
makes a Wankel engine much lighter, typically half that of a conventional engine with 
equivalent horsepower, and as a result the performance decrease per ‘displacement 
unit’ is more than offset by this light weight. Considerable effort went into designing 
rotary engines in the 1950s and 1960s. They were particularly interesting because of 
their smooth, very quiet running, and their reliability resulting from their simplicity. 
However the seals at the corners of the triangular rotor proved to be the design’s 
Achilles heel, and the engines tended to wear out much faster than originally 
predicted. Many interesting ideas have come along to attempt to fix these problems, 
but not enough money has been invested to truly solve them.”
5 Despite its superb 
power-to-weight ratio, the Wankel rotary engine is only used by NSU, Citroên and 
Mazda (playing the role of spreaders or imitators in a broad sense in this case) for a 
limited number of  models  they produce.  The difficulty in competing with regular 
engines seems due not only the above-mentioned technical shortcomings and the 
difficulty car and engine manufacturers have in convincing consumers. It is also due 
to the difficulty for consumers or spreaders to take the risk of buying those very 
specific cars. There are many more examples like this. Thus, most digital products 
were created because ‘infomediaries’ (i.e., speculators in the Kirznerian sense) and 
consumer virtual communities actively participated  in  their definition and  helped 
adapt their social uses within the production processes of ICTs. What we would like 
to point out is that a new market (that is, a new product and/or a new technology) can 
only be created when something new emerges from ‘local’ interactions between 





                                          7.       The Evolution of Markets 
 
 
From the Austrian perspective, a market is a process of discovery. Discovery 
implies novelty.  According to the Austrian approach, it is therefore impossible to 
                                                                 
5 http://www.fact-index.com/w/wa/wankel_engine.html   15 
characterize a market by its given set of initial endowments, individual preferences 
and available technologies, as it is the case in the GEE theory. Markets continually 
evolve with capital accumulation, growth, technological progress and change in 
consumer tastes. 
An Evolving Market 
According to Lachmann, it is easy to imagine how buyers can contribute to the 
evolution of supply in a flexprice market.  In a fixprice market, buyers lose this 
possibility and are excluded from the sphere of production. However, the number of 
flexprice markets  is  continuously  dropping in relation  to  the increase  in  fixprice 
exchanges. This evolution stems from some kind of standardization of the goods sold 
on this market. Evidence shows that the number of different goods sold on a market 
is steadily decreasing. This reduction in variety is accompanied by a routinization of 
seller and buyer behavior. In fact, a selective process is set up and three sets are 
selected: 1)  a set of characteristics
6 of a class of goods 2) a set of sellers and 
consumers, and 3) a set of possible behaviors. For example, the actual behaviors of 
consumers and sellers on the standardized foodstuff markets belong to a set of 
possible behaviors. This set is characterized by the fact that c onsumers  do not 
usually negotiate the prices or quality of goods in a supermarket. As a result of this 
and the structure of the market supply, these prices are not very flexible. According to 
Lachmann’s terminology, this is the type of fixprice market that corresponds to the 
final state of markets  since it is associated with an institutional device  in which 
individuals’ plans of action are coordinated through  a  price mechanism  that 
individuals ignore in their practical experience.  
This evolution of markets from flexprice to fixprice mechanisms can also be 
characterized as a type of institutional change, i.e., change in the ‘market institutions’. 
This interpretation is  fully  in line with the Wieserian approach. It should not be 
understood as a scheme in which institutional change takes place on its own and 
creates new constraints to economic evolution. This is a view which seems to be 
favored by Kirzner when he characterizes institutions as a simple framework for 
entrepreneurial strategies which gives agents some information on market operation 
rules (Kirzner, 1992, p. 91). In other words, institutions are what they are. Quite the 
opposite, in Lachmann’s view, market institutions are partially endogeneized.  The 
                                                                 
6 These characteristics must be considered Lancaster’s.   16 
process  of endogeneization is related to the structure of supply,  especially to its 
division between entrepreneurs,  intermediaries and followers and therefore to the 
space afforded to the various forms of uncertainty we put forward. This also helps 
explain  Lachmann’s distinction between fixprice and flexprice markets: “ While the 
number of pricemakers diminishes, the range of actions open to manufacturers is 
enhanced: they have taken over the pricefixing function from merchants. In our world, 
flexible prices have become a characteristic of financial asset markers and large raw 
materials markets”. But “there is ... no doubt that the evolution of fixprices constituted 
a response to the needs of the modern production economy. In a flexprice market, it 
is impossible to send out price lists to customers” (Lachmann, 1986, p.125). Even if, 
in an evolutionary game framework, strategic uncertainty (or imperfect competition in 
a more standard framework) is a possible explanation of the fixprice generalization 
process, the Austrian framework leads to the characterization of fixprice mechanisms 
as organizational arrangements, helping to cope with the information and knowledge 
needed by  a certain type of  seller and  consumer. From this standpoint, fixprice 
markets introduce an element of permanence and certainty  that allows sellers and 
buyers to make medium or long-term economic calculations more easily. Fixprice 
systems therefore perfectly suit the purpose Loasby attributes to institutions, which 
we may also attribute to organization in this case: “Social life is made possible by the 
fact that we do not at all continuously use our imagination to devise and try out new 
plans of actions, but for the most part unquestioningly accept current conventions, all 
of which are questionable, and some of which are doubtless defensible only on the 
grounds that any convention is better than none, and that change is difficult. In 
markets, institutions promote coordination by furnishing a common basis of decision, 
while discouraging inquiry into the soundness of that basis (Loasby, 1989: 164–5). 
Still within speculative activities, we may consider the organization of price regulation. 
Here, Kirzner’s approach is obviously the  most popular. In keeping with Hayek’s 
view, Kirzner suggests that markets appear to be a vehicle in which to disseminate 
broadly dispersed information. The problem is transforming private information into 
information available to the general public. In the beginning of the market process, 
agents do not know what the equilibrium prices are. They  make decisions, but the 
absence of information leads them to  offer  what often  initially  turns out to be 
disequilibrium prices. Rationing or inventory accumulations then appear, providing   17 
information about where the initial guesses were misplaced. Information is thus 
acquired by agents thanks to their actions: transmission of information in markets that 
comprise a collection of entrepreneurs enables them to discover opportunities which 
they had hitherto ignored. As in the case of fixprice mechanisms, economic evolution 
provides the natural framework of Austrian markets.  Here also, market processes 
help reduce a more Kirznerian uncertainty in providing the framework for experiments 
between  entrepreneurs, speculators  and consumers.  Interactions b etween the 
various types of sellers and consumers imply the development of a kind of network 
between  manufacturers  and consumers. Consumers can thus acquire and test 




A similar process characterizes the evolution of interacting markets. However, 
due to the considerable interdependency between different activities and agents in 
the actual economies, the evolution of different markets is constrained by the 
necessity of maintaining a minimal degree of coherence between them. In fact, the 
existence of horizontal as well as vertical interdependency systems between the sets 
of goods, already identified by Menger, excludes the possibility that the evolution of 
different markets participating  in  the production of a given final good could be 
random. However, there is no deterministic co-evolution of those markets. A new 
market can emerge inside a set of stabilized markets and then provoke a 
reorganization of this set. For example, the emergence of the cellular phone modified 
the entire organization of the phone market system. In fact the routinized behaviors of 
the  various sellers acting on those interacting markets ( phone  manufacturers,  
operators of those markets, regulators, etc.) were forced to change, because of the 
success of the cellular phone innovation. This success was due to the existence of a 
set of behaviors that ruled out the old one. Such a success finds its origin in the 
constitution of a local
7  interaction  system between a set of  sellers and buyers 
(manufacturer-entrepreneurs, operator-intermediaries, consumers, etc).  
                                                                 
7 The word local needs encompasses more than its sole spatial significance.   18 
At the end of the day, an innovation’s success does not so much rest on a heroic 
entrepreneur, but on  the existence and interaction of a group of agents behaving 
according to rules that can lead to consistent actions. This result entails a profound 
modification of the general set of markets interlinked in the production of a given 
good, as, in our case, the phone market system.  
 




We already observed that in line with Menger’s, Wieser’s and Lachmann’s 
views, institutions play a crucial role in market creation and evolution. Among these 
institutions, we also stressed the specific case of routines. Now, in considering the 
role of routines among the institutions comprising markets, it is helpful to keep in 
mind the contention of Langlois and Robertson (1995, p. 1) that “the most elemental 
form of a business institution ... is a productive  routine, a habitual pattern of 
behaviour embodying knowledge that is often tacit and skill-like”. Loasby thinks that if 
productive routines exist, market routines can also exist: “ Nelson and Winter’s 
analysis of routines and their evolution appears readily applicable to well-developed 
markets, in which certain ways of doing business come to be accepted. There are 
various methods of determining prices —  for example, they may be set by buyers, 
sellers or intermediaries, settled by bargaining, or arrived at by one of several 
auctioning procedures  — but there is rarely more than one method  used in one 
market. In addition, the customs of the trade usually prescribe such matters as credit 
terms, after-sales service, and conformity to market standards, including compatibility 
with other suppliers’ products.  These constitute the policy of the market, and both 
facilitate and constrain the decisions of those who participate in it” (Loasby, 1991, p. 
18). From this standpoint, market routines could include predictive rules of thumb 
such as the set of forecasting techniques described by Keynes (1937: 214) to 
characterize the workings of financial markets: choosing adaptive behavior when 
most of the agents believe that there will be no discontinuity between past and future; 
selecting a mimetic behavior when one is convinced that other agents will also do it; 
or trying to guess the average market opinion are regular and stable behaviors based 
on a single belief or on set of beliefs. Certainly, in a context of self-fulfilling 
prophecies, these behaviors undoubtedly reduce uncertainty.   19 
Routines should therefore not be opposed to innovations. They are very useful in 
allowing the succession of the market creation and evolution phases. They  help 
stabilize the environment of a world in which various types of uncertainty mix, forming 
networks.  This is why, in Equilibrium and Evolution, Loasby (1991: 41) defines ‘a 
network of information and ideas’ as: “Trade relations’ strongly reduce the degree of 
uncertainty with which the firm is confronted when it buys products from another firm 
and uses them as inputs.” But this is also true when we consider the relation of a firm 
with its rivals. In this case, past experience and the existence of behavior patterns 
moderate risk and, therefore, confirm how organization limits uncertainty. Finally, the 
existence of the network also permits the firm to differentiate its products and to 
create goodwill relations with its customers: it therefore replaces an uncertain 
demand with more guaranteed prospects of  sales.” The existence of this type of 
network confirms Richardson’s views  that market organization is a combination of 
competition and cooperation. To put it differently and in keeping with Loasby’s remark 
(Loasby, 1991: 84): pure non-cooperative markets only correspond to extreme cases 
and market normality does not exclude organization ‘as an alternative arrangement’: 
(to quote Ménard, 1995: 170). It is not incompatible, therefore, with ‘conscious and 
deliberate coordination of activities’ (Ménard, 1995: 172). From this standpoint, 
external organization is an adequate antidote against strategic uncertainty since it 
permits agents to have a priori knowledge of decisions made by their potential rivals. 
 
       9.     Some Theoretical Consequences 
 
 
It could be argued that the preceding  notion of market emergence and 
evolution is not compatible with the prevailing interpretation of the Austrian legacy. As 
stated earlier, one of the main assumptions of the Austrian tradition is the role of 
entrepreneurship as individual leadership and we tended to minimize this. 
  In our opinion, the standard interpretation of Austrianism is neither convincing 
nor relevant. First, entrepreneurship  does not only  apply to the  individual 
Schumpeterian  entrepreneur, but  also to  all  agents  with the ability  to invent  new 
behaviors.  From this standpoint,  a consumer can  exhibit  entrepreneurial abilities
8. 
Second, we noticed that market creation is much more complex and, at  the very 
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least, involves two other types of agents, i.e., speculators and followers. Third and 
more fundamentally, subjectivism, e.g.  the Austrian version of methodological 
individualism, is not at all incompatible with the view that a new market emerges due 
to a complex set of new behaviors rather than by isolated heroic behavior. It results 
from a type of inter-individual cooperation in which every agent has his own purpose. 
This sometimes generates unexpected social consequences, e.g., innovations.  
This new markets emergence approach has some similarities with the game 
theory approach when it investigates the existence of local conformity inside global 
diversity (Young, 1996). From that perspective, a local stable set of strategies can 
coexist with a global stable set of completely different (and not necessarily 
compatible) strategies. The difference with  the preceding approach is that it 
generates a diffusion process, whereas in a classical game context the two sets of 
strategies can only coexist  when markets are in (long-term) equilibrium. In other 
words, the local set of strategies implies that the other strategies have to change 
progressively. A diffusion process changes the “old” behaviors in order to ensure the 
compatibility of strategies  with the new behaviors.  This viewpoint relates to  the 
concepts of modularity (Langlois, 2002), percolation and stability as well. Aoki (2001), 
for instance,  does  not only investigate the process of convergence towards 
equilibrium, but also the way institutions are changing (which is too often considered 
an exogenous process due to mutations). We know that in classical game theory, the 
set of strategies is fixed a priori. In this framework, institutions usually change when 
given multiple possible Nash equilibria. Individuals switch from one to the other, 
possibly more efficient equilibrium. However, as we also know, this explanation first 
assumes that the different possible equilibria exist. Moreover, the theory of rational 
selection between equilibria by the players themselves is still in its infancy, unless we 
assume a highly unrealistic learning process. Aoki shows that if the structure of the 
game is subjectively known by  the individuals, they are able to induce institutional 
changes because both exogenous and endogenous changes occur. The idea is that 
individuals have a set of possible strategies they can use. Because they have shared 
beliefs about the endogenous rules of the game, they define a consequence function 
of their strategies on a subjective basis. Their private beliefs make them choose their 
best response from  the set of possible strategies, given the set of shared beliefs, 
their private beliefs and the environmental impacts (Aoki, 2001). Changes can then   21 
occur exogenously (a change in the environment) as well as endogenously (change 
in private beliefs, inferences rules and so on). In this model, technological changes 
are conceived as exogenous variables. However it is possible to interpret the 
emergence and evolution of new markets as endogenous processes. According to 
Aoki (2005), new markets emerge when strategic complementarities are present. 
What we can draw from Aoki’s contribution  – even if his approach clearly 
differs from the Austrian one – is that adequate strategic complementarities favor the 
emergence of new markets. For instance, market institutions and organizations help 
create new goods and technologies when they are complementary. 
In Austrian terms, we could argue that the existence of sufficiently stable relations 
between entrepreneurs and intermediaries (inter-firm agreements, explicit or implicit 
contracts,  etc.),  entrepreneurs, speculators and followers (local  manufacturing 
systems, subcontracting, R&D agreement, etc.) or sellers and consumers (existence 
of consumers communities, interaction between suppliers and consumer-testers, 
etc.) essentially increases the opportunities of ex ante production coordination. From 
this standpoint, as Richardson pointed out, the so-called ‘market imperfections’ very 
often  help drastically  reduce strategic (or parametric) uncertainty. The amount of 
information on what Richardson calls ‘market conditions’ available to agents (and in 
particular, to entrepreneurs) crucially depends on ‘the nature of the economic 
arrangements or systems postulated’ (Richardson, 1959, p. 223) and, in particular on 
market organization.  This is why he stresses  that  it is misleading to too strongly 
oppose market and organization: “Thus although I shall have occasion to refer to 
cooperation on market transactions as distinct and alternative models of coordinating 
economic activity, one must not imagine that reality exhibits a sharp line of 
distinction: what confronts us is a continuum passing from transactions, such as 
those on organized commodity markets where the cooperative element is minimal, 
through intermediate areas in which there are linkages of traditional correction and 
goodwill and finally to those complex and interlocking clusters, groups and alliances 
which represent cooperation fully and formally developed” (Richardson, 1972, pp. 
886–7). This is nothing more than another way of  stressing complementarities 
between market institutions and productive organization. 
 
                         10.      Some Empirical Consequences   22 
 
The idea that markets are coevolving towards a n institutionalized and 
organized economic state can be exemplified by some empirical illustrations. The 
emergence of a market, such as the automotive market, offers an example of the 
bundling process as described above.  In  the beginning, this market was a 
manufacturer/consumer  market. Each  vehicle  was the result of collaboration and 
negotiation between a manufacturer and buyer who was actively participating in the 
product’s definition. The manufacturer was either making all of the car parts or using 
the  services of a  specialist  to produce very specific parts of the  car.  The 
standardization of the manufacturing process (mechanization and organization) and 
the product progressively reduced the role of the consumer. At this point, consumers 
are no longer directly involved in the car’s production, they simply choose between a 
number of given options.  This  is the  example of a market evolving towards  an 
organized and  institutionalized market associated  with  an easily  foreseen  set of 
behaviors. 
A very different example can be given for the telephone market. This market 
evolved  before the automotive market.  A number of  important (often public) 
manufacturers  were  positioned  on  a  rather well organized  market in which 
innovations were limited. Some newcomers arrived and created niches, such as the 
possibility of using frequencies to make a call. This possibility led to the emergence 
of cellular phones, which completely modified the organization of the phone market 
system, but also the behaviors of the participants  in this system. T elephone 
manufacturers, operators, regulators and public bodies had to change their behaviors 
on these interacting markets. New problems arose:  how  should authorities  sell 
frequencies,  giving that they are  selling packages?  What  is the optimal auction 
system? How will people change their behavior when confronted with  new rules to 
the game (e.g. new institutions)? Will private institutions be more efficient than public 
ones, given that the rules cannot be completely enforced? All of these problems offer 
an interesting look at how the impact of a local disturbance spread to all parts of a 
complex sub-system. 
 
                                         11.  Conclusive Remarks 
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Two distinct market approaches have been shown to co-exist in the present paper. 
The first, popularized by  von Mises and Hayek, prevails in Austrian circles today. A 
second approach, based on the works of Menger, Wieser and Lachmann, has also 
been introduced. Stressing the importance of uncertainty, institutions and economic 
change, this  approach opens a new route and creates new perspectives for 
economists who are keen to explain real market characteristics  and especially their 
organizational and institutional changes. In this paper, we only took a few short steps 
down that new route, investigating the creation and evolution processes of markets in 
conjunction with these changes. Many other steps are needed if we wish to more 
precisely explore the new perspectives invoked in our paper and exploit this different 
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